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The Inadequate Global Policy Response to
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights:
Impact on Access to Medicines in Lowand Middle-Income Countries
LISA FORMAN†

Access to medicines in low- and middle-income countries is
arguably one of the most explicit examples of how economic and trade
rules can derogate from the rights to health and life protected in
international human rights treaties.1 Despite multiple efforts to address
access to medicines, material access gains outside of HIV/AIDS are so
negligible as to suggest that the primary determinants of the drug gap
are not being responded to. This article suggests that this lack of
progress is partly a result of obstacles created by the World Trade
Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property2 (TRIPS Agreement) and the proliferating use of bilateral and
free trade agreements (FTAs).3 In this light, the global drug gap
provides a signal of the extent to which international actors are willing
© 2016 Lucy Forman.
† Canada Research Chair in Human Rights and Global Health Equity, Assistant Professor,
Dalla Lana School of Public Health, Director, Comparative Program on Health and Society,
Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. I thank Peter Danchin for inviting me
to participate in the Symposium on Clinical Trials and Access to Essential Medicines in
African Countries at the University of Maryland School of Law. I also thank the Editors for
their helpful insights on this paper.
1. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, annex, International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, at 51 (Dec. 16, 1966) (recognizing “the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” in Article 12);
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, annex, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 53
(Dec. 16, 1966) (recognizing the “inherent right to life” and associated rights in Article 6).
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
3. See infra Part II.
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to give teeth to fundamental human rights like health when powerful
commercial and trade interests point in other directions. This paper
surveys this landscape, outlining the inaccessibility of essential
medicines due to pricing, the impact of trade-related intellectual
property rights on pricing, and the trade law and global health policy
responses to the affordability and access challenges posed by
intellectual property rights protections under the TRIPS Agreement
and FTAs. It concludes that existing policy initiatives have failed to
adequately respond to the impact of trade-related intellectual property
rights on access to medicines, and that bolder measures are required,
including suspending the application of trade-related intellectual
property rights to essential drugs for low- and middle-income
countries.
I. ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND PRICING
The centrality of medicines to realizing human rights,
development, and health system imperatives is illustrated in multiple
domains: essential medicines are understood as a core obligation of
states under the right to health,4 are recognized as a fundamental
building block of health care systems capable of providing universal
health coverage,5 and are included within global development policies
like the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Sustainable
Development Goals.6
Yet despite a plethora of international initiatives designed to
improve access in low- and middle-income countries,7 two billion
people still cannot access essential medicines,8 either because there are
4. United Nations [U.N.] Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
(Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14].
5. See World Health Organization [WHO], Monitoring the Building Blocks of Health
Systems: A Handbook of Indicators and Their Measurement Strategies, at vi, 59–69 (2010),
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/systems/WHO_MBHSS_2010_full_web.pdf.
6. Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development, U.N.,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2016); G.A. Res. 70/1,
Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, at 16 (Sept. 25,
2015). The Millennium Development Goals are development goals adopted globally in 2000
to guide global development policy to 2015. Millennium Summit (6–8 September 2000), U.N.,
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/millennium_summit.shtml (last visited Apr. 19,
2016). The Sustainable Development Goals aim to replace the MDGs with a new fifteen year
development agenda. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra, at 1.
7. For example, the MDGs and the WHO Global Strategy and Plan of Action discussed
below. See infra Part IV.
8. WHO, WHO MEDICINES STRATEGY 2004–2007: COUNTRIES AT THE CORE, at 3, WHO
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not enough drugs available in public health systems or because the
drugs that are there or in the private sector are priced out of reach or
not covered by health insurance.9 As a United Nations (U.N.) report
monitoring compliance with the MDG on medicines illustrates that
“essential medicines remain unaffordable and insufficiently available
in developing countries.”10 This finding is reiterated in a 2015 report
which found that “medicine availability is poor in many countries
(particularly in the public sector), prices are high, and treatments,
especially those for noncommunicable diseases, are unaffordable for
those on low wages.”11
Affordability is thus a key determinant of drug access, alongside
rational selection and use; sustainable financing; and adequate
infrastructure.12 However, the influence of affordability is amplified in
low- and middle-income countries, where drugs are one of the largest
out-of-pocket expenditures for the poor and one of the largest health
care expenditures consuming anywhere from 25–70 percent of national
health-care expenditures.13 Indeed, multiple studies confirm that low
availability and unaffordable prices exacerbate illness and death and
impoverish people.14 This situation leaves people to make terrible
Doc. WHO/EDM/2004.5 (2004), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s5416e/s5416e.pdf.
The WHO defines essential medicines as medicines “that satisfy the priority health care needs
of the population. They are selected with due regard to public health relevance, evidence on
efficacy and safety, and comparative cost-effectiveness.” Essential Medicines, WHO,
http://www.who.int/topics/essential_medicines/en (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). The
importance of essential medicines is underscored by the fact that they are designated as core—
and hence prioritized—obligations under the right to health. See General Comment No. 14,
supra note 4, ¶ 12.
9. See U.N. MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL GAP TASK FORCE, MDG GAP TASK
FORCE REPORT 2014: THE STATE OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT, at 53–59,
U.N.
Sales
No.
E.14.I.7
(2014),
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdg_gap/mdg_gap2014/2014GAP_FULL_E
N.pdf [hereinafter MDG Gap Task Force Report 2014]; U.N. MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT
GOAL GAP TASK FORCE, MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015: TAKING STOCK OF THE GLOBAL
PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMent, at 53–58, U.N. Sales No. E.15.I.5 (2015),
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdg_gap/mdg_gap2015/2015GAP_FULLR
EPORT_EN.pdf [hereinafter MDG Gap Task Force Report 2015].
10. MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2014, supra note 9, at 53.
11. MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015, supra note 9, at 58.
12. See WHO, supra note 8, at 4–5.
13. Id. at 4.
14. WHO, THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION 2011: MEDICINE PRICES, AVAILABILITY
AND AFFORDABILITY, WHO Doc. WHO/EMP/MIE/2011.2.1 (2011); Laurens M. Niëns et al.,
Quantifying the Impoverishing Effects of Purchasing Medicines: A Cross-Country
Comparison of the Affordability of Medicines in the Developing World, 7 PLOS MED., Aug.
31,
2010,
at
6–7,
http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/asset?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000333.PD
F.

FORMANFINALBOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

IMPACT ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES

3/16/2017 2:55 PM

11

choices: between food and no health care, or health care and
impoverishment. To the extent that access to essential medicines is a
core obligation of states under the right to health, the inaccessibility of
such medicines would constitute a prima facie violation of the right to
health.
The issue of affordability came to prominence around
inaccessible antiretroviral medicines (ARVs) for HIV/AIDS,15 with
early access campaigns focused on drugs for infectious diseases such
as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.16 While infectious diseases
are a pressing problem in low- and middle-income countries, the need
for accessible drugs to treat noncommunicable diseases is no less great,
especially as developing countries increasingly shoulder the “double
burden” of communicable and noncommunicable diseases.17 Yet many
essential medicines for both communicable and noncommunicable
disease remain unaffordable. For example, a 2010 study found that
drugs for asthma, diabetes, hypertension, and adult respiratory
infection in sixteen low- and middle-income countries were so
unaffordable as to be impoverishing.18 Moreover the early focus on
infectious disease remains narrow: as a prominent example, medicines
for hepatitis C remain unaffordable, resulting in very low treatment
rates in low-income countries where prevalence may be highest.19
These examples underscore the need for affordable medicines across
the health domains, and not simply in relation to prominent infectious
diseases.
II. TRIPS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Generic medicines policies are broadly recognized as a key policy
intervention to control health budgets and make medicines more
15. See Ellen ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change: HIV/AIDS, Patents and Access
to Medicines for All, 14 J. INT’L AIDS SOC’Y, Mar. 27, 2011, at 1–2,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3078828/pdf/1758-2652-14-15.pdf. ARVs
for HIV/AIDS were priced at approximately USD $10–15,000 per person per annum, a
prohibitive cost in low- and middle-income countries where the vast majority of people with
HIV/AIDS live. Id. at 1.
16. See generally Lisa Forman et al., Human Rights and Global Health Funding: What
Contribution Can the Right to Health Make to Sustaining and Extending International
Assistance for Health?, 6 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE (2012), at 2–8,
http://blogs.shu.edu/ghg/files/2012/12/VOLUME-VI-ISSUE-1-FALL-2012-Human-Rightsand-Global-Health-Funding-What-Contribution-Can-the-Right-to-Health-Make-toSustaining-and-Extending-International-Assistance-for-Health_-.pdf
17. I. C. Bygbjerg, Double Burden of Noncommunicable and Infectious Diseases in
Developing Countries, 337 SCIENCE 1499 (2012).
18. Niëns, supra note 14, at 5.
19. See MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015, supra note 9, at 61.
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affordable.20 Yet the policy space for countries to provide affordable
medicines is bound sometimes wholesale by trade rules around
intellectual property rights. The introduction in 1995 of the TRIPS
Agreement required countries acceding to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) to give patent protection to pharmaceuticals,
something that around 50 countries had not done previously.21 Even in
countries providing patents, the requirement of 20-year patents
conferring exclusive rights to prevent nonconsensual use was
unprecedented. The introduction of patents of this nature resulted in
monopolistic pricing that saw sometimes dramatic increases in drug
prices, as in Malaysia where drug prices increased by 28 percent per
year between 1996 and 2005.22
TRIPS has flexibilities to give governments policy space to meet
public health and social welfare imperatives. These include delaying
the onset of the agreement for the least developed countries (LDC);
tailoring patent criteria or excluding patents for inventions to protect
health and life; and permitting countries to manufacture or import
generic versions of patented drugs or import cheaper versions of
patented drugs under measures like compulsory licenses and parallel
imports (albeit strictly limited).23 Global debates focus on these
flexibilities because they allow policymakers to ensure that high prices
resulting from exclusive patenting rights do not negatively impact
public health imperatives. Pharmaceutical companies countered that
use of these mechanisms in low and middle incomes countries
negatively impacts their incentives to continue producing new
medicines,24 an argument decisively countered in the 2006 report of the
20. WHO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO] & WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION [WTO], PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION:
INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADE, at 156
(2012), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf.
21. Sandra Bartelt, Compulsory Licenses Pursuant to TRIPS Article 31 in the Light of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 6 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 283,
285 (2003).
22. Richard D. Smith, Carlos Correa & Cecilia Oh, Trade, TRIPS and Pharmaceuticals,
373 LANCET 684, 689 (2009).
23. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6, 30, 31, 41, 65. Parallel
importing allows countries to import cheaper versions of patented medicines. Compulsory
licensing allows governments to manufacture generic versions of patented medicines without
corporate consent during national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency, for
public non-commercial use, or where usage is intended to remedy a practice determined after
judicial or administrative processes to be anti-competitive. See The Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS
Agreement
and
Public
Health,
WHO,
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en (last visited May 13, 2016).
24. See, e.g., The TRIPS Agreement and Pharmaceuticals: Report of an ASEAN
Workshop on the TRIPs Agreement and its Impact on Pharmaceuticals, at 12–17 (2000),
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/h1459e/h1459e.pdf.
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WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Health
[CIPIH Report] which held that where “the market has very limited
purchasing power, as is the case for diseases affecting millions of poor
people in developing countries, patents are not a relevant factor or
effective in stimulating R&D and bringing new products to market.”25
Yet global debates focus on TRIPS flexibilities because their use
continues to attract staunch opposition from companies and their host
governments in the form of litigation, drug removals, trade sanctions,
and diplomatic pressures.26 More or less at the same time, regional and
bilateral FTAs are restricting TRIPS flexibilities in ways that extend
monopoly pricing and limit market entry for generic medicines with
stark impacts on affordability. For example, “TRIPS-plus rules,” so
called because they exceed the standards in the TRIPS agreement,
restrict the grounds on which compulsory licenses can be issued;
prohibit parallel imports; restrict autonomy to decide patent criteria;
limit patent exclusions; limit market approval for generic drugs; extend
data exclusivity requirements and patent terms; and enable “evergreening” provisions (the practice of taking out new patents on existing
medicines in order to maintain monopolies).27
The price impacts on medicines can be stark: in 2007, Oxfam
found that after its introduction the US-Jordan FTA resulted in a 20
percent increase in drug prices.28 Trade-related intellectual property
rights have therefore discernibly increased medicine prices in many
low- and middle-income countries and considerably reduced policy
space to respond to these restrictions.
III. THE DOHA DECLARATION AND THE ‘PARAGRAPH 6’ SYSTEM
The impact of trade-related intellectual property rights on access
to medicines came most prominently to public attention in 2001 when
activist and media attention focused on corporate litigation in South
Africa, which aimed to prevent the government from passing
25. WHO COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC
HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, at 22 (2006),
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf.
26. See Lisa Forman, Trade Rules, Intellectual Property and the Right to Health, 21
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 337 (2007).
27. Lisa Forman & Gillian MacNaughton, Moving Theory into Practice with Human
Rights Impact Assessment of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, 7 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC.
109, 114 (2015).
28. See OXFAM INT’L, ALL COSTS, NO BENEFITS: HOW TRIPS-PLUS INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RULES IN THE US-JORDAN FTA AFFECT ACCESS TO MEDICINES 2 (2007),
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/all%20costs,%20no%20benefits.pdf.

FORMANFINALBOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

14

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/16/2017 2:55 PM

[Vol. 31:8

affordable medicines legislation despite the fact millions were dying
annually from lack of access to medicines for diseases like
HIV/AIDS.29 This caused a tremendous public outcry and contributed
to enabling African countries at the Doha round of WTO negotiations
to push through the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health to give legal clarity to states’ use of these flexibilities.30
The Doha Declaration explicitly endorsed the right of WTO members
to protect public health and promote access to medicines for all and to
use TRIPS flexibilities to the fullest to do so.31 It specified that these
flexibilities included the right to grant compulsory licenses and to use
parallel importing.32 It also asked the TRIPS council to find a solution
to the inability of WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacity to effectively use compulsory licensing and to extend the
LDC waiver from applying TRIPS to pharmaceuticals to 2016.33
This request prompted the development of the “Paragraph 6
System,” so called because of its location within the Doha Declaration.
The system aimed to enable countries to export drugs to LDC without
domestic manufacturing capacity, since TRIPS restricts the use of
compulsory licenses to supplying the domestic market, leaving
countries without domestic manufacturing capacity without a means to
export generic pharmaceuticals made elsewhere. In 2005, the TRIPS
Council proposed to incorporate the system as a permanent TRIPS
amendment when it was accepted by two-thirds of WTO members
(with a deadline of 2007 extended to December 31, 2015, in 2013, and
then to December 2017 in 2015).34
However the system has been used only once, when in 2007, a
Canadian generic manufacturer exported ARVs to Rwanda.35 The cost
and complexity of the Canadian experience suggest why the Paragraph
29. See Lisa Forman, “Rights” and Wrongs: What Utility for the Right to Health in
Reforming Trade Rules on Medicines?, 10 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 37, 43–45 (2008).
30. See Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 27, 38–42 (2002).
31. WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 4, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
32. Id. ¶ 5.b.
33. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.
34. See General Council Decision, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement – Fifth
Extension of the Period for the Acceptance by Members of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS
Agreement, WTO Doc. WT/L/965 (Dec. 2, 2015).
35. See Richard Elliott, Managing the Market for Medicines Access: Realizing the Right
to Health by Facilitating Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals—A Case Study of
Legislation and the Need for Reform, in ACCESS TO MEDICINES AS A HUMAN RIGHT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY RESPONSIBILITY 151, 156–57 (Lisa Forman &
Jillian Clare Kohler eds., 2012).
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6 System is used so infrequently: over six years, the manufacturer
made two drug shipments and declined to renew the license,36 and
industry opposition saw legislative efforts to streamline the process
voted down twice in parliament.37
Another reason countries are not using the system is because they
are buying from countries that do not need to issue compulsory
licenses, like India, which Ghana did in 2005 instead of importing from
Canada where the drugs were patented.38 That India’s role in providing
access to affordable generics is of crucial importance globally is shown
clearly with ARVs, the greatest success of the global access
campaigns. Of the 13.6 million people accessing ARVs in 2014,39 it is
estimated that 80 percent are dependent on Indian generics to do so.40
India has this generic manufacturing capacity because it took full
advantage of the transition periods in TRIPS that all low- and middleincome countries have when acceding to it.
However the introduction in 2005 of pharmaceutical patents
means India will no longer be able to supply generics of newer ARVs
and other drugs other than through the use of TRIPS flexibilities. The
Indian Government has incorporated these flexibilities into law,
including by curtailing “ever-greening” by refusing patents if
companies cannot show clear novelty or efficacy.41 The Indian
Government used this flexibility when it denied a patent to Novartis
on a new formulation of Gleevec, a blood cancer drug, which it
contended lacked novelty. This decision was upheld in 2013 by the
Supreme Court of India.42 While the Doha Declaration is explicit that
36. See, e.g., APOTEX INC., SUBMISSION TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: BILL C-393, AN ACT TO AMEND THE PATENT ACT (DRUGS FOR
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES) AND TO MAKE A CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENT TO
ANOTHER
ACT
(Oct.
26,
2010),
http://www.apotex.com/global/docs/submission_order_en.pdf; Gloria Galloway, Tories Block
Bid to Make Cheaper Medicines for Poor Nations, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 28, 2012),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/tories-block-bid-to-make-cheapermedicines-for-poor-nations/article5759286.
37. See Galloway, supra note 36.
38. See WHO, WIPO, & WTO, supra note 20, at 178.
39. JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME on HIV/AIDS, FAST TRACK: ENDING THE AIDS EPIDEMIC BY
2030,
at
7
(2014),
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/JC2686_WAD2014report_en.pdf.
40. See Brenda Waning et al., A Lifeline to Treatment: The Role of Indian Generic
Manufacturers in Supplying Antiretroviral Medicines to Developing Countries, 13 J. INT’L
AIDS
SOC’Y,
Sept.
14,
2010,
at
3,
5,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2944814/pdf/1758-2652-13-35.pdf.
41. See Patralekha Chatterjee, India’s Patent Case Victory Rattles Big Pharma, 381
LANCET 1263 (2013).
42. Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1 (India).
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states can use flexibilities like compulsory licenses to ensure access to
medicines, India has faced corporate litigation over patent denials,43
and a full range of U.S. diplomatic and trade pressures, with worrying
signs that these might be prompting intellectual property policy
reform.44 These kinds of reforms may threaten India’s central role as
supplier of generic medicines to much of the developing world.
IV. UNITED NATIONS RESPONSES TO TRADE-RELATED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
The U.N. system’s policy response to the affordability of
medicines has been mixed. Access to medicines was first included as
an objective in the original MDGs largely because of immense social
pressures, which turned the issue into a focal point for political actors.45
However, its location and formulation in the text of the MDGs reflects
an institutional mindset at the time of its drafting that was very
reluctant to upset the political and commercial interests at stake. For
example, MDG 8.e aims to provide access to affordable essential drugs
in developing countries in cooperation with pharmaceutical
companies,46 an approach that seemed to preclude ostensibly
“uncooperative” measures like compulsory licenses. While the
inclusion of this goal in the MDGs brought global access to medicines
within the scope of annual progress monitoring of the MDGs, the goal
failed to quantify a target or timeframe and did not speak of TRIPS
flexibilities even in general. This response took at face value corporate
arguments that strict intellectual property rights in developing
countries were critical to protect the innovation cycle that produced
new medicines.47 However, studies and reports since then confirm that
patents in developing countries do not stimulate research and

43. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Order No. 45/2013 (Intellectual Property
Appellate Board, Chennai, 2013).
44. See, e.g., Ben Wolfgang, Modi Pressed to Address Intellectual Property Reforms,
WASH. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/29/indiasnarendra-modi-pressed-to-address-intellectu.
45. For example, the analysis of how activist mobilization around corporate litigation to
prevent the South African government from adopting an affordable medicines law influenced
political responses to HIV/AIDS medicines. See generally Forman, supra note 29. (I forget if
it’s small caps or not)
46. Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development, supra note 6; G.A. Res.
55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration, ¶ 20 (Sept. 18, 2000) (resolving to “encourage
the pharmaceutical industry to make essential drugs more widely available and affordable by
all who need them in developing countries”).
47. See, e.g., Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation, and Access to New
Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 849 (2002).

FORMANFINALBOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

IMPACT ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES

3/16/2017 2:55 PM

17

development of new medicines.48 The timidity of global policy
initiatives like the MDGs in naming practices like compulsory licenses
therefore appears to be misplaced.
The 2006 CIPIH report prompted the most comprehensive global
policy response yet in the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on
Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health (GSPA) produced
by a WHO intergovernmental working group between 2006 and 2008
and adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2008.49 The GSPA
specified over one hundred actions to address medicines access and
innovation in eight areas, including crucial recognitions regarding
actions in relation to intellectual property rights. For example, it
recognized that countries had general authority to use flexibilities
recognized in the Doha Declaration and that appropriate pricing
policies should include use of such flexibilities.50 Further, the GSPA
identifies flexibilities like research exceptions, export to countries with
no manufacturing capacity, “regulatory exceptions,” and abuse of
intellectual property rights.51
However the GSPA also makes no mention of compulsory
licensing, the flexibility at the heart of these debates and explicitly
endorsed in the Doha Declaration. Nor does it mention parallel imports
and restrictions of data-exclusivity to enable generic market entry—
flexibilities in TRIPS that are generally restricted or removed in FTAs
and whose usage generally prompts legal or economic pressures.52 The
GSPA also stepped back from explicitly addressing the kinds of
“TRIPS-plus” rights promulgated in FTAs, with the final strategy
deleting a section cautioning states not to adopt TRIPS-plus protection
in bilateral trade agreements in favor of a suggestion that states take
into account, where appropriate, the impact on public health when
considering adopting more extensive intellectual property rights than
in TRIPS.53 While the strategy gives great clarity to action in many
other places, the failure to identify key flexibilities and common
practices limiting them suggests a weak commitment to supporting key
strategies that can impact pricing, and to guarding against political and
48. See WHO COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND
PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 25.
49. See WHO, GLOBAL STRATEGY AND PLAN OF ACTION ON PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY,
at
1
(2011),
AND
http://www.who.int/phi/publications/Global_Strategy_Plan_Action.pdf.
50. World Health Assembly Res. 61/21, ¶¶ 37–38 (May 24, 2008).
51. Id. ¶¶ 30(2.4)(e), 36(5.2)(d), 39(6.3)(a), 39(6.3)(f).
52. See generally Forman & MacNaughton, supra note 27.
53. See World Health Assembly Res. 61/21, supra note 50, ¶ 36(5.2)(b).
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economic interference in this area. These gaps raise questions about
whether the current strategy could respond to key domains of drug
access.
Certainly global policy has progressed since then, with the
medicine goal in the Sustainable Development Goals which replace the
MDGs calling for states to:
[s]upport the research and development of vaccines and
medicines for the communicable and noncommunicable diseases that primarily affect
developing countries, provide access to affordable
essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, which affirms the right of developing
countries to use to the full the provisions in the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public
health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines
for all.54
This goal is markedly broader and more ambitious than its
corollary in the MDGs, encompassing both innovation of new
medicines and access to existing medicines, incorporating both
communicable and noncommunicable disease, and explicitly citing the
Doha Declaration in affirming the right to use TRIPS flexibilities in
full. A similar proposal is made in the 2016 report of the United
Nations High Level Panel on Access to Medicines, which recommends
that “WTO members should commit themselves, at the highest
possible political levels, to respect the letter and the spirit of the Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, refraining from any action
that will limit their implementation and use in order to promote access
to health technologies,”and that this includes “adopt[ing] and
implement[ing] legislation that facilitates the issuance of compulsory
licenses.”55 These policy shifts suggest that the global perspective on
access to medicines have changed considerably since the MDGs were
formulated in 2001, albeit that specific references to mechanisms like
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compulsory licensing and parallel imports remain rare.
V. THE INADEQUATE OUTCOMES OF GLOBAL POLICY INITIATIVES
It is troubling then that this thicket of global policy has had almost
no impact on primary barriers to affordability: TRIPS-plus intellectual
property rights are not only expanding but are getting stricter, with
TRIPS flexibilities being limited, and even eradicated, and the global
movement of generic medicines through international borders being
continually obstructed under measures to eradicate counterfeit
medicines.56 TRIPS flexibilities are increasingly the only remaining
aperture through which state policy for affordable medicines can
operate and, as indicated above, India, the primary provider of these
medicines, is being stringently targeted. Global access to affordable
medicines is more, not less, threatened.
While the full use of TRIPS flexibilities may be the primary
solution on the table to resolve the inaccessibility of affordable
medicines, we should not be fooled into believing that it is anything
but a poor solution. TRIPS flexibilities turn the fundamental human
right to health and affordable medicines into a rigidly restricted
exception to a property right,57 and affordable medicines, the price
developing countries must pay to enter wealthy markets and the global
economy. Existing policy proposals do little to mitigate this impact and
have failed to propose anything more than the most incremental of
steps. As a case in point, the 2012 U.N. Commission on HIV and the
Law recommended that WTO members urgently suspend TRIPS for
essential drugs for low- and middle-income countries, and that the
U.N. Secretary General convene a new body to recommend a new
intellectual property regime for drugs.58 The U.N. Secretary-General’s
High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines was set up in response, and
offered an important testing ground for promoting an intellectual
property system that didn’t simply enhance protection of the public
interest as an externality to its ethos of advancing trade interests, but
that located this system within the broader system of international law
56. See, e.g., Kaitlin Mara, India May Be Nearing Dispute Settlement with EU over
Generic Drug Seizures, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.ipwatch.org/2009/08/28/india-may-be-nearing-dispute-settlement-with-eu-over-generic-drugseizures.
57. See Philippe Cullet, Patents and Medicines: The Relationship Between TRIPS and
the Human Right to Health, 79 INT’L AFFAIRS 139 (2003).
58. See U.N. GLOBAL COMMISSION ON HIV AND THE LAW, RISK, RIGHTS & HEALTH (July
2012),
http://www.hivlawcommission.org/resources/report/FinalReportRisks,Rights&Health-EN.pdf.
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that recognizes that the “common good of humankind [is] not reducible
to the good of any particular institution or ‘regime.’”59 Yet the Panel’s
report did little to move beyond prior policy proposals in this area,
losing an important opportunity to progress beyond the status quo on
access to medicines.60
Finally, it is worth noting that transformation in this area has
always come from social actors who brought the full weight of human
rights law and social pressures to bear on naming, shaming, and
prodding appropriate action from international institutions, companies,
and their supporting government in relation to AIDS treatment.61 Their
successes underscore that the global drug gap is created and reinforced
by human decisions and action and can accordingly be undone by
human decisions and action.
VI. CONCLUSION
Access to medicines in low- and middle-income countries
globally has been negatively impacted by trade-related intellectual
property rights in a range of fora. Global policy initiatives have failed
to respond appropriately to the restrictive impact of these rights. If the
global drug gap is to be remediated, bold and decisive action at the
global level must replace the business as usual response that has
characterized global policy initiatives to date. In the current political
climate of a new U.S. administration, the boldness of action that we
may see is highly unlikely to move in the direction of equity and
fairness in access to medicines.
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